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After the Big Deals Are Done
by Jonathan Nabe (Collection Development Librarian and Coordinator, OpenSIUC, 605 Agriculture Drive, Southern Illinois
University Carbondale, MC 6632, Carbondale, IL 62901; Phone: 618-453-3237) <jnabe@lib.siu.edu>

H

ere is comfort for those on the verge of
leaving Big Deals, solace for those who
already have. Whether you arrived at
this juncture by principle or lack of principal,
the message is the same: the survival of the
academy is not at stake.
Southern Illinois University Carbondale’s Morris Library left three Big Deals
over the course of 2009 and 2010. Yet faculty
continue to conduct research, publish, and
teach their students, who continue to write
their theses and dissertations and get their
degrees. Grants continue to be secured.
People continue to come into the Library to
use our resources. All evidence indicates that
subscriptions to entire publisher portfolios are
not essential to the functioning of a modern
research university. Not that this serves as
some kind of epiphany for higher education;
SIUC, like every other higher education
institution, functioned quite well for over a
hundred years before the advent of the Big
Deal — thrived, and even grew.
SIUC is a modern research university, in
the Doctoral University: Higher Research Activity category, according to the 2016 Carnegie
Classification. We are not in the top tier, we
are in the second tier. This puts us in the same
category with 106 other U.S. higher education
institutions, including Auburn, Dartmouth,
Oklahoma State, the University of Rhode
Island, and the like.
Our participation in Big Deals foundered
on the faulty premise underlying the model,
which is predicated on the maintenance of a
library’s expenditure at the point of time in
which it signs on to the agreement (its “historical spend”), plus an annual percentage
increase. The faulty premise is that our budget
would continue, at least on average, to increase
enough to meet the Big Deals’ increases. This
did not happen, as it did not and still does not
happen for many institutions — probably for
the majority of the 106 Highers like us.
In practice, because the Deals’ annual increases exceeded the increases in the Library’s

The Economics of the Big Deal ...
from page 20
A bull represents the attitude of an investor
with an optimistic, “bullish” outlook. A bear
looks at the market pessimistically and has a
grumpy, “bearish” outlook. And then there
is “the farm,” or the chickens and the pigs.
Chickens are characterized by investors who
are afraid to take risks and tend to see a low
return on their investment. Pigs on the other
hand are the opposite of Chickens. These are
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budget, they were consuming an ever larger
share of our budget. In 2004, we spent 24%
of our budget on these Deals; by 2008, the
figure had risen to 33%. This, in turn, meant
less money for the universe of resources available for us to choose from — even while that
universe is always expanding. There are two
costs associated with this: the cutting of the
Library’s existing resources to compensate,
and the opportunity cost of not adding new
resources because the budget is squeezed and
there is no additional funding available. Assessments of the value of Big Deals (discussed
further below) that do not include these costs
fail to present the whole story.
They also ignore the big picture — the impact of Big Deals on the scholarly publishing
marketplace as a whole. The costs mentioned
above also reverberate in the marketplace,
since institutions locked into Big Deals are
spending less elsewhere. Where
do libraries go to find offsets
for the increasing costs of
the Big Deals? To those
publishers and vendors
who do not operate on
that model, particularly
academic and professional societies, university
presses, and independent
publishers. This has the
effect of forcing these
publishers, who are not
driven by the search for
profit and who charge lower subscription prices
than do commercial publishers, to consider
other arrangements for their publishing, all
too often resulting in their consumption by
the commercial publishers. There are diverse
reasons for smaller publishers to pursue such
a move, but one important consideration is
the guaranteed subscription base (and hence
income) provided by libraries’ participation in
Big Deals. We are indisputably contributing
to market consolidation, which results in ever
higher prices for all of us.

high-risk investors are looking for a big score
in a short length of time. They tend to follow
hot tips and invest without sound decision
making. Often, the bulls and bears reap profits
from pigs because of the latter’s recklessness
in investing. Thus the old stock market saying,
“Bulls make money, bears make money, but
pigs just get slaughtered.”
Taking the TBL approach when considering
Options vs. Needs and Costs vs. Budgets relies
on: evaluating data, considering and setting
value thresholds, balancing patrons’ wants
along with mission of the library and factoring

Leaving the Big Deals levels the playing
field for all publishers and vendors in our
collection development decisions. We decide,
of course channeling the preferences of the
University community, what we will buy or
subscribe to, based on all those traditional and
developing factors and metrics that librarians
have at their disposal. This allows us to develop a true freedom collection.
Locally, then, an important outcome of
leaving Big Deals is the increased flexibility
and control over the collection gained, since
less of the budget is tied up in arrangements
that lock in an ever-increasing obligation.
Unfortunately, in these times of scarcity, the
flexibility we have achieved is measured out
not in what new products we can add, but which
existing resources we will cut. Nevertheless,
the problem would be exacerbated if we had
maintained our Deals — the estimate is that
we save annually between
$300,000 and $400,000
(depending on what annual increase percentage
is used) since our departure; that is the amount we
would we paying each and
every year to the three publishers above what we are
paying now, if we had not
left the Deals. The figure
would of course increase
every year. To compensate for this
difference, we would be forced to
cut other resources, not because they are less
valuable, but because they are not protected by
similar agreements. To put it in perspective,
this is about the amount we spend on books
each year.
Greater flexibility is also achieved in the
ability to adjust our current subscriptions from
the Big Deal publishers, since we are not contractually bound to maintain our current spend.
Optimal pricing is achieved on an annual basis
if we do maintain our subscriptions, but we have
continued on page 23

risk aversion in the current fiscal economy to
arrive at sustainable decisions concerning Big
Deal packages. There is no easy answer. As
with investments, we all have to be diligent
in watching the economy and assessing how
the supply and demand will play out, for there
are never any guarantees. You may be a bull
or a bear, but always learn from the chickens
and pigs.
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been able to reduce our expenditures with the
publishers when needed. The important point
is that we can do so much more easily now.
Negotiations have not been adversely affected by our departures. Publishers still, and
always will, want as much of our (and your)
budget as they can get, and will negotiate to
achieve that. This is why, contrary to what may
seem obvious, we have for the most part been
able to negotiate lower increases than what we
had when we were in the Big Deals.
The advantages to not participating in
Big Deals are clear. How to explain their
resiliency? Most institutions are not so flush
with funding that the costs of Big Deals, as
described above, are avoided.
The value must be assumed to be worth
those costs.
The appeal of Big Deals appears obvious:
access to journals not otherwise available. The
value also appears obvious, as most frequently
shown by download numbers. We too were
susceptible to the appeal, and impressed by
the apparent value, of our Deals. When we
looked more closely, which we were forced
to do because the faulty premise of the model
became more and more exposed, the lush landscape of plenty looked more like a mirage, and
the numbers were printed on a house of cards.
Assessment of resources relies heavily on
the number of downloads and a Cost Per Use
calculation. (These may or may not be the
only assessment components, but is anyone not
using them?) These metrics, particularly the
latter, can then be compared to those of other
resources. The higher the download numbers,
and the lower the Cost Per Use figure, the stronger the case for the Big Deal, or any resource.
Little attention is given to any interpretation
of the numbers. Downloads are taken at face
value as an objective criterion of assessment.
A download is a “good thing,” an accurate
indicator of demand. Further, downloads are
downloads, and it is assumed that there is
no difference between a download from one

publisher, vendor, or resource compared to
another. Partly this is due to the success of the
Counter standards that have been developed,
which do achieve at least some consistency in
the reporting of resource use. Partly it is due
to the difficulty of tracing how downloaded
content is actually used.
There is a real need for the profession
to examine these assumptions more closely.
Much is riding on them, but serious examination of them has only occurred around the
edges. Our experience suggests that there are
significant flaws in these assumptions, and
that while download numbers are essential in
assessment, they do not contain any meaning in
and of themselves. A detailed description of the
evidence provided by our experience at SIUC
is outside the scope here, but is summarized
below (more information can be found in Nabe,
Jonathan and Fowler, David. “Leaving the
‘Big Deal’ … Five Years Later.” The Serials
Librarian 69, No. 1 (Jul 2015): 20-28. doi:10.
1080/0361526X.2015.1048037). For the sake
of brevity, the case of only one publisher is
discussed here, but the observations and trends
are applicable for the others as well.
Downloads of non-subscribed content alone
from this publisher amounted to 11,254 from
597 titles in the year before we ceased our
Big Deal. These are phenomenal numbers
that would seem to go a long way to justifying
the Deal. Closer examination revealed some
concerns, however. To begin with, 62% of
the non-subscribed titles had averaged less
than 12 downloads per year, and a full 10%
had received no downloads. By any measure,
these were not essential titles for the University.
Even more clarification was provided by
analysis conducted post-departure. We did
this analysis because we wanted to measure
the impact of our decisions; it was possible,
after all, that they had been the wrong ones.
The results indicated otherwise.
Downloads and the CPU calculations
derived from them can only work for paid
content. How do you assess the value of lost
content, or measure the impact of a decision
to end access to it? Requests via Interlibrary
loan for lost titles can serve as a proxy for

actual demand, and that is the method we have
used. Objections can be made that ILLs do
not fully represent all demand, either, since
researchers can use professional and personal
networks, individual subscriptions, open access
repositories or websites, etc., to get the content.
Download numbers over-report demand, ILL
requests under-report it. The real demand lies
somewhere in between, no one really knows
where. But in addition to serving as a corrective to the download numbers in the attempt to
measure demand and calculate value, analysis
of ILL requests in this context also fulfills a
practical need: it tells us the impact on library
operations, staff time and outlays, of leaving
Big Deals.
Again, for brevity’s sake details are provided for the single publisher used above. Briefly,
the annual number of ILL requests averages
2% of the pre-departure downloads of the
non-subscribed titles, over the five year period
post-departure. 47% percent of the lost titles
which had some downloads pre-departure have
not had any ILL requests. The average number
of ILL requests per title is less than two. There
has been no flood of requests for ILLs, putting
pressure on the staff, or spike in our costs,
putting pressure on our budget. While the
ratio of requests to downloads has increased
over the years — to be expected as additional
issues of the journals are published — it has
never reached a level that cannot be absorbed
by the library as part of its everyday workflow.
If any given title is shown by ILL requests to
warrant an individual subscription, swapping
for a lesser used title is always possible — but
has not been indicated to date.
What this analysis shows is that for us, Big
Deals were unaffordable overkill. Nice to have,
for public relation’s sake and for convenience’s
sake too. But they were not providing essential
content; on the contrary, they were forcing
us to cut essential resources, and would have
done so at an accelerating rate had we maintained them. Leaving them has not led us to
the brink of oblivion, it has just taken us back
to the place we all came from: a Library with
the subscriptions that the University needs and
that we can afford.

Doubling Down on the Big Deal in Wisconsin
by Doug Way (Associate University Librarian for Collections and Research Services at University of Wisconsin-Madison,
Memorial Library, 728 State Street, Madison, WI 53706; Phone: 608-265-5466) <doug.way@wisc.edu>

T

he University of Wisconsin-Madison
has a long history with the Big Deal.
In 2001 Ken Frazier, who at the time
was the University Librarian at UW-Madison,
wrote an article in D-Lib Magazine in which
he coined for the first time the phrase the “Big
Deal” as a way to describe journal publishers’
large-scale journal aggregations.1 In his article,
Frazier warned libraries against trading shortterm benefits for long-term consequences.
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The Big Deal, he warned, weakened library
collections with unwanted journals, increased
libraries’ dependence on publishers, reduced
budgetary flexibility, limited libraries’ ability
to influence the scholarly communications
system in the future, threatened serials vendors,
and placed limits on resource sharing. Frazier
said UW-Madison would take a principled
stance and hold out against the Big Deal. It
would license electronic access to only the

highest-used journal titles. It would keep
the rest of its journals in print, select journals
title-by-title, and continue to rely on resource
sharing for access to other content.
Four years later Frazier published another article on the Big Deal.2 In it he outlined
how UW-Madison was continuing to hold
out against the Big Deal, but was also faced
with both a difficult local budget situation
continued on page 24

<http://www.against-the-grain.com>

23

